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Abstract 
 
A new law of physics is proposed, defined on the cosmological 
scale but with significant implications for the microscale. 
Motivated by nonlinear dynamical systems theory and black-hole 
thermodynamics, the Invariant Set Postulate proposes that 
cosmological states of physical reality belong to a non-computable 
fractal state-space geometry I , invariant under the action of some 
subordinate deterministic causal dynamics ID . An exploratory 
analysis is made of a possible causal realistic framework for 
quantum physics, based on key properties of I . For example, 
sparseness is used to relate generic counterfactual states to points 
p I∉  of unreality, thus providing a geometric basis for the 
essential contextuality of quantum physics and the role of the 
abstract Hilbert Space in quantum theory.  Also, self-similarity, 
described in a symbolic setting, provides a possible “realistic” 
perspective on the essential role of complex numbers and 
quaternions in quantum theory. A new interpretation is given to 
the standard “mysteries” of quantum theory: superposition, 
measurement, nonlocality, emergence of classicality and so on. It 
is proposed that heterogeneities in the fractal geometry of I  are 
manifestations of the phenomenon of gravity. Since quantum 
theory is inherently blind to the existence of such state-space 
geometries, the analysis here suggests that attempts to formulate 
unified theories of physics within a conventional quantum-
theoretic framework are misguided, and that a successful 
quantum theory of gravity should unify the causal non-Euclidean 
geometry of space time with the atemporal fractal geometry of 
state space.  
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“The task is not to make sense of the quantum axioms by heaping more structure, 
more definitions, more science fiction imagery on top of them, but to throw them away 
wholesale and start afresh. We should be relentless in asking ourselves: From what 
deep physical principles might we derive this exquisite structure? These principles 
should be crisp, they should be compelling. They should stir the soul.”  Chris Fuchs, 
in Gilder (2008) 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to propose a new geometric law of physics about 
the nature of physical reality on the cosmological scale, and to use it to 
perform an exploratory analysis of a possible causal realistic framework for 
quantum physics. Resulting from this analysis, new proposals are made about 
the role of gravity in quantum physics.  
 
The Invariant Set Postulate is framed in terms of invariance, a concept that 
forms the very bedrock of physics, and conjectures that states of physical 
reality are defined by a fractal geometry I , embedded in state space and 
invariant under the action of some subordinate causal dynamics ID . The 
postulate is motivated by two concepts that would not have been known to 
the founding fathers of quantum theory: the generic existence of invariant 
fractal subsets of state space for certain nonlinear dynamical systems, and the 
notion that the irreversible laws of thermodynamics are fundamental rather 
than phenomenological in describing the physics of extreme gravitational 
systems.  
 
The notion that fractals may play a role in fundamental physics is not itself 
new. However, whilst earlier studies have focussed on the concept that space-
time itself may be fractal (Ord, 1983; Nottale, 1984; El Naschie, 2004), the 
proposal in this paper concerns the ontological significance of fractal 
geometry in state space.  
 
Although quantum theory is unsurpassed in terms of its agreement with 
experimental data, it is suggested that the Invariant Set Postulate provides a 
geometric framework for a deeper understanding of the foundations of 
quantum physics than can be provided by quantum theory itself. For 
example, as discussed in the body of this paper, the new perspective appears 
to reconcile many of Einstein’s views about the incompleteness of quantum 
theory, with those of the standard Copenhagen Interpretation which 
emphasises the essential role of the observer in defining the very concept of 
reality. 
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Section 2 provides physical motivation for the Invariant Set Postulate as a 
new ontological postulate in physics. Section 2.1 reviews relevant aspects of 
nonlinear dynamical systems theory, whilst Section 2.2 discusses the state-
space flow associated with the contents of the idealised “Hawking Box”, a 
massive container holding enough matter to form one or more black holes. 
Here it is argued that the dynamical evolution of small volumes in the state 
space of the Hawking Box will plausibly asymptote to the types of zero-
volume invariant sets discussed in Section 2.1. These ideas are combined to 
formulate the Invariant Set Postulate, discussed in Section 3. 
 
Section 4, the heart of the paper, discusses quantum theory assuming the 
Invariant Set Postulate. On the invariant set, the quantum-theoretic state is 
straightforwardly interpreted as defining a probability with well-defined 
sample space (Section 4.1). In terms of this, the sparseness of fractal invariant 
sets in state space provides a novel explanation why any realistic 
interpretation of quantum theory must be contextual, as required by the Bell-
Kocken-Specker theorem (Section 4.2); essentially, dynamically unconstrained 
counterfactual states are associated with points of unreality p I∉ . This in turn 
leads to a new perspective on the necessity for the abstract Hilbert space 
formulation of quantum theory, a theory which does not distinguish between 
real and counterfactual states; the quantum-theoretic state of a quantum sub-
system is defined for all conceivable measurement that might be made on it. 
In this perspective, an abstract “probability state” is associated with 
neighbourhoods of of state space not belonging to I , but now there is 
underlying sample space and the mathematical properties of this abstract 
probability state are defined merely by appropriate algebraic properties, here 
that of the vector space (Section 4.3). Since I  is non-computable, it is 
algorithmically undecidable and hence irreducibly uncertain, whether or not 
a quantum state vector can be associated with an underlying sample space on 
the invariant set, or not.  
 
A key property of the quantum Hilbert Space is that it is complex. A realistic 
interpretation of complex numbers and quaternions is provided in Section 4.4 
in terms of permutations on bit strings that correspond to bivalent sample 
spaces of trajectory labels on I . It is suggested that state-space magnification 
of I ’s self-similar structure by ID ’s positive-exponent Lyapunov vectors 
provides the geometric basis for periodicity in these permutations, thus 
leading to a novel explanation for the notion of quantum coherence.  
 
Combining these perspectives, a comprehensible account of many of the 
standard “mysteries” of quantum theory is outlined in Section 5, including 
new speculations concerning the role of gravity in quantum physics.  
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Concluding remarks are given in Section 6. 
 
Throughout this paper, when the word “state” is written without further 
qualification, it is meant in its conventional classical meaning. Similarly the 
phrase “state space” is meant in its classical sense (where it generalises the 
notion of phase space eg of an N-particle system). When the notion of “state” 
is meant its quantum mechanical sense, ie as an element of a Hilbert Space, 
then the word will be clearly qualified eg by referring to the “quantum-
theoretic notion of state” or, occasionally, as the “quantum state vector”. 
 
2 Motivations for the Invariant Set Postulate 
 
The remarks in this section provide motivation for the Invariant Set Postulate, 
to be defined in Section 3. There are two different aspects to this motivation.  
 
2.1 Dynamically Invariant Sets 
 
Since one of the objectives of this paper is to develop a new perspective on the 
role of gravity in quantum theory, it is appropriate to begin discussion with 
mention of the seminal work of Poincaré, and Birkhoff who found that the 
motion of as few as three gravitationally-bound Newtonian particles is 
chaotic, ie with aperiodic evolution in a bounded domain of state space. By 
considering entire cosmologies such as the Mixmaster solution (Misner et al, 
1973), it appears general relativity also admits chaotic space-time dynamics. 
The use of geometric concepts, based on the type of invariant set to be 
considered below, appears to be essential for a relativistically-invariant 
definition of chaos (Cornish, 1997).  
 
Over a half century after Poincaré, Lorenz (1963) proposed a very different 
type of chaotic motion, associated with forced nonlinear dissipative 
dynamical systems ( )=X f Xɺ . In contrast with Hamiltonian systems, the states 
( )tX  of such systems evolve asymptotically to fractionally-dimensioned 
(fractal) attractors. If X is initialised on an attractor, X  stays on it forever; the 
attractor is a dynamically-invariant subset of state space.  
 
Fractal attractors reveal some of the most beguiling of geometries known to 
physics, and form the basis of discussion in this paper. However, the 
dynamical systems which generate these geometries are usually considered 
phenomenological rather than fundamental, since they are explicitly 
dissipative. In Section 2.2, a inherently relativistic reason for supposing these 
geometries to be fundamental will be proposed.    
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Such a dynamically-invariant attractor can be formed from the asymptotic 
evolution of a volume ( )V t  in state space under the action of the dissipative 
( 0∇ ⋅ <Xɺ ) dynamics. In the case of the Lorenz (1963) system, ∇ ⋅ Xɺ  is constant 
over state space, in other systems (eg Rössler, 1976) ∇ ⋅ Xɺ  is flow dependent 
but negative overall. As discussed in Section 2.2, systems of the latter type are 
envisaged as describing a dynamically-invariant set of spatial cosmologies X , 
where regions 0∇ ⋅ <Xɺ  describe states of the universe containing black holes.  
 
The following properties of chaotic invariant sets will be needed in the 
discussions in Sections 3-5.  
 
The invariant sets under consideration have zero measure and are nowhere 
dense in the Euclidean state space in which they are embedded. As such, a 
perturbation which is random with respect to the continuum measure of state 
space will almost certainly map a point on the invariant set, off it.  As an 
example, consider the classical Cantor set. A point on the Cantor set can be 
represented on the interval [0,1] by an exceptional fraction Cn  with no digit 
“1” in its base-3 representation. By contrast a random perturbation can be 
represented on the interval by a normal (Hardy and Wright, 1979) fraction 
r
n whose base-3 representation has, for example, equal frequencies of the 
digits “0”, “1” and “2”. Almost certainly the “perturbed” number C rn n+  will 
not be normal, (eg it will contain “1” digits), and hence cannot represent a 
point on the Cantor set.  The sparseness of fractal invariant sets is central to a 
new perspective on counterfactual reasoning, discussed in Section 4.  
 
Using the p-adic metric (Khrennikov, 1997), these invariant sets can be shown 
to be metric spaces and it is therefore possible to talk about neighbourhoods 
on the invariant set. Interestingly, p-adic numbers have been studied in the 
context of mathematical physics (eg Alberverio and Khrennikov, 1998). It 
remains to be seen whether ideas in this paper can be linked quantitatively to 
such studies.  
 
Fractal invariant sets are non-algorithmic. For example, Dube (1993) has 
shown that the invariant sets of iterated function systems emulate the non-
halting states of Turing machines, and undecidable problems in the classical 
theory of computation have a corresponding geometric interpretation. For 
example, the Post Correspondence Problem is equivalent to asking whether a 
given line intersects the invariant set of an iterated function system. More 
generally, Blum et al (1998) have shown that if an invariant set has fractal 
dimension, it cannot be a halting set. Below it is proposed that the 
undecidability of these invariant sets provides the fundamental basis for 
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quantum uncertainty, ie uncertainty as to whether or not a specific quantum 
state vector can be associated with an underlying sample space. Penrose 
(1989) has given arguments for why non-computability might lie at the heart 
of fundamental physics.  
 
Invariant sets can be constructed from time series of experimental data, using 
the Takens Embedding Theorem (Takens, 1981). Suppose the time series of 
some component of X  is measured every τ  units of time. Then the invariant 
set can be reconstructed from a sufficiently long time series of this 
component. An important conceptual point relevant to the discussion on free 
variables in Section 5, is that a sufficiently long time series of even an 
energetically unimportant or otherwise seemingly irrelevant component of 
X can be used to construct the entire invariant set.  
 
One key technique to represent the evolution of states on an invariant set is 
that of symbolic dynamics (Lind and Marcus, 1995; beim Graben and 
Atmanspacher, 2006). Consider a bivalent partition Π  of I  based on disjoint 
subsets ,A B I⊂  such that all points of I  either belong to A or to B, and a 
sequence eg .AABABB... where the nth member of the sequence represents the 
subset in which X  belongs at the nth iterate of the dynamical evolution 
operator. Then the same sequence .AABABB.. can symbolically represent X  at 
the first iterate, and dynamical evolution is effected by a simple shift of the 
sequence one place to the left, relative to the radix point. In the case of so-
called generating partitions, this symbolic representation is homeomorphic to 
the original dynamics. For the situations considered here, “A” and “B” will 
label trajectories in the basin of attraction of relatively stable quasi-stationary 
regions of the invariant set, corresponding to “measurement outcomes”. In 
general, such “A” and “B” trajectories will be intertwined with respect to one 
another in neighbourhoods on the invariant set (Palmer, 1995). In this case, 
the bit string .AABABB... defines a sample space of trajectory segments. As 
discussed in Section 4, permutations of such bit strings can be defined which 
are identical to the unit quaternions, themselves linked to the algebra of 
quantum spin (Palmer, 2004).  
  
An important property of fractal sets is self similarity. Readers may be 
familiar with animations which zoom into the Mandelbrot set revealing 
periodicity in the intricate fractal structure. Lapidus and van Frankenhuis 
(2006) in their study of fractal geometry were able to exploit the self similarity 
of fractal strings to assign them with a complex dimension, defined from the 
poles of a corresponding zeta function. Below the positive-exponent 
Lyapunov vectors of the dynamics associated with the invariant set are 
considered to provide the dynamic “zoom”, thereby generating periodicity in 
coarse-grain probability measures with respect to the intertwined partition. 
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As discussed in Section 4, this may provide a dynamical basis for the 
oscillatory nature of the quantum state vector, from the perspective of the 
Invariant Set Postulate.  
 
A key conceptual component of the perspective pursued below, is that the 
geometry of the invariant set should be considered as more primitive than the 
differential equations whose asymptotic behaviour generates the invariant 
set. This is not the normal perspective used in dynamical systems theory 
where the difference or differential equations are primary. In this respect it is 
worth commenting on some of the global geometric and topological 
approaches to defining fractal invariant sets. In studying the structure of 
chaotic attractors in 3-dimensional state space, Birman and Williams (1983) 
focussed on the knottedness of the associated unstable periodic orbits. For 
example, the knots describing the Lorenz (1963) attractor are prime, fibered 
with non-negative signature. In higher dimensions, studies have been made 
characterising fractal invariant sets using simplicial spaces and corresponding 
homology invariants (Sciamarella and Mindlin, 1999). In this respect, it is 
worth noting that the very subject of topology arose in significant measure 
from Poincaré’s attempts to understand and characterise the behaviour of the 
gravitational 3-body problem, in the absence of any general analytic solution 
to the problem.   
 
2.2 The Hawking Box  
 
The last section began with Poincaré’s work on Newtonian gravitational 
systems. Here we discuss the role of an extreme non-Newtonian gravitational 
system which may be pivotal in generating the fractal properties of the 
invariant set studied in this paper.   
 
Conventional physics is formulated in terms of Hamiltonian dynamics, and 
the state-space flow is consequently incompressible: 0∇ ⋅ =Xɺ . However, 
consider a compact system big enough that a black hole could potentially 
form from the collapse of matter comprising the system. How can we 
characterise the asymptotic state space flow of such a system? Is it 
Hamiltonian? 
 
This has been the topic of considerable debate, especially between two of the 
leading experts in gravitation theory (Hawking and Penrose, 2000). The 
debate hinges around a thought experiment in which some vast but 
gravitationally isolated system is placed in a hypothetical box with reflecting 
walls - the Hawking Box. Indeed we could imagine the Hawking Box without 
boundary, since it is observationally possible that the observed universe may 
have compact spatial topology.  
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What is the asymptotic state-space flow of the Hawking Box?  
 
Two of the most important results in 20th Century theoretical physics are 
relevant here: the proof that space-time singularities formed by gravitational 
collapse are generic (Penrose, 1965), and the quantum field theoretic 
calculation that black holes formed as a result of such gravitational collapse 
have precise thermodynamic properties (Hawking, 1975). The second law of 
black-hole thermodynamics describes the loss of information as matter 
collapses to a black hole, and subsequently evaporates as thermal radiation.  
 
As a result of the second law, Penrose (eg in Hawing and Penrose, 2000) 
argues that the state space flow of the Hawking Box must be convergent 
0∇ ⋅ <Xɺ  in regions of state space containing one or more black holes. Penrose 
also argues that shrinking of state-space volumes contradicts Liouville’s 
theorem and concludes that there must therefore be compensating regions of 
state-space divergence, thus motivating Penrose’s (1989) gravitationally-
induced Objective Reduction mechanism for quantum state-vector collapse.  
 
A thorough review of the Liouville theorem has been given recently by 
Ehrendorfer (2006). Liouville’s original paper (Liouville 1838) concerns a 
result on the material derivative of the Jacobian of the mapping between a 
solution of a differential equation and its initial state, and is not specific to 
Hamiltonian systems. In a simple form, the Liouville equation for the 
probability density function ρ  of the state vector X  is  
 
 ( ) 0
t
ρ ρ∂ + ∇ ⋅ =
∂
Xɺ  (1.1) 
 
reminiscent of the Newtonian mass continuity equation in physical space. If 
the system is Hamiltonian so that 0∇ ⋅ =Xɺ , then co-moving volumes are 
conserved in state-space. On the other hand, even for systems where the state-
space flow is compressible, the Liouville equation (1.1) guarantees 
conservation of probability. That is to say, Liouville’s theorem in its general 
(ie non-Hamiltonian) form does not require co-moving volumes in state space 
to be conserved. If the existence of flow convergence due to black hole 
thermodynamics is being assumed, there is no requirement to use the more 
restrictive volume-preserving form of the Liouville equation. As such, 
Liouville’s theorem does not itself imply the need for the Objective Reduction 
mechanism.  
 
Hence, suppose state-space volumes shrink in those parts of state space 
containing black holes, but without any corresponding divergence due to 
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Objective Reduction. What are the consequences? The situation is analogous 
to the dissipative dynamical systems’ approach in the previous section with 
state-dependent ∇ ⋅ Xɺ . It can therefore be supposed that volumes ( )V t  will 
shrink to zero and asymptote onto one of the following: a fixed point, a limit 
cycle, or a fractal attractor. Since fractal attractors are generic, we will assume 
henceforth that the zero-volume asymptotic limit is a fractal set.  
 
Clearly it will take an infinite time for a generic volume in the state space of 
the Hawking Box to evolve precisely onto its invariant set. However, treating 
the Hawking Box as a model of the universe, we ask in the next section 
whether there might exist a hitherto unknown law of physics, defined on the 
cosmological-scale, which postulates that the universe as a whole lies 
precisely on its invariant set, I . As a dynamically-invariant set, then if the 
universe lies on I  now, then it always has lain on it, and always will lie on it. 
Thus this putative law of physics, named below the “Invariant Set Postulate”, 
is best thought of as an atemporal geometric constraint in state space. 
Although defined on the cosmological scale, the Invariant Set Postulate will 
be shown to have fundamental ontological implications for physics on the 
microscale.  
 
3 The Invariant Set Postulate 
 
The Invariant Set Postulate posits the existence of a fractionally-dimensioned 
subset I  of the state space of the physical world (ie the universe as a whole). 
I  is an invariant set for some presumed-causal (ie relativistic) deterministic 
dynamical system ID ; points on I , hereafter referred to as world states, 
remain on I  under the action of ID .  World states of physical reality are those, 
and only those, lying precisely on I .   
 
It is conceptually important to view I  as more primitive than ID . Given I , 
( )ID t  maps some point p I∈  a parameter distance t  along a trajectory of I . 
Crucially, ID  is undefined at points I∉ .  This contrasts with the more 
familiar situation where a dynamical system is defined by differential or 
difference equations D  , which asymptotically generates an invariant set DI . 
In this latter, classical, situation, D  is defined at all points of state space.  
 
If states of physical reality necessarily lie on I , then points p I∉ in state space 
are to be considered literally “unreal”. In a hypothetical “oracle” theory of 
physics which (non-computability notwithstanding) had perfect knowledge 
of I , these points of unreality would be an irrelevance. However, for 
practically-relevant theories (such as quantum theory and any algorithmic 
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extension) the intricate structure of I  is unknown and these points of 
unreality cannot be ignored. We return to this in Section 4.3 where one of the 
key questions considered is how to represent quantum-theoretic states in a 
mathematically-consistent way for such points of unreality.   
 
The search for an atemporal description of physics has been long-standing (eg 
Barbour, 1999; Price, 1996). The Invariant Set Postulate provides support to 
this search: treating the geometry of the invariant set as primitive, introduces 
a fundamentally atemporal perspective into the formulation of basic physics. 
Such a perspective is absent in classical physics, in which differential 
equations are considered primitive. This has ramifications for a new 
perspective on the emergence of classicality in quantum physics, discussed 
further in Section 5. 
 
Since no classical theory requires states to be constrained to invariant sets, 
even when the theory supports such sets, the proposal here does not 
constitute a return to a “classical physics” formulation of quantum theory.  
 
4 Quantum Theory and the Invariant Set Postulate 
 
In this section the perspective brought to quantum theory by the Invariant Set 
Postulate is discussed. 
 
4.1 Probability on the Invariant Set  
 
Quantum-theoretic descriptions of sub-system states fall under the general 
definition provided by Hardy (2004): the state of a system is defined to be that 
thing represented by any mathematical object which can be used to predict 
the probability associated with every measurement that may be performed on 
the system.   
 
Quantum-theoretic states are defined in terms of an abstract complex Hilbert 
Space. Hence, if A  and B  are quantum states, then so is A Bψ α β= + , 
where ,  α β ∈C . It is, of course, one of the great mysteries of quantum theory 
(some would say the central mystery) as to the physical reality of the 
superposed state. The Invariant Set Postulate provides a simple answer to 
this: on the invariant set, and only on it, A Bψ α β= +  can be interpreted 
as defining a probability mixture of two discrete alternatives based on a well-
defined associated sample space. The issue of why ,  α β  must be complex 
rather than real numbers, is discussed in Section 4.4.  
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For concreteness, suppose that Bob measures the spin of a spin-1/2 particle as 
“up” relative to a prepared Stern-Gerlach apparatus. How can this be 
described in the context of the Invariant Set Postulate? If the particle detector 
in the “up” beam fires at time 1t  , label the world state at 1t  by the letter “A”. 
Now track the world state trajectory backwards on the invariant set to an 
earlier time 0t  before the particle entered the Stern Gerlach apparatus, and 
now label the back trajectory from 0t  to 1t  by the letter “A”. Consider a 
neighbouring trajectory at 0t , also on the invariant set. If this trajectory passes 
through a region of instability between 0t  and 1t  (ie where neighbouring 
trajectories diverge), then it may conceivably evolve to a world state at 1t , in a 
distinctly different quasi-stationary region of the invariant set corresponding 
to a situation where the particle detector in the “down” beam fires. Such 
neighbouring trajectories will be labelled “B”.  
 
If the neighbourhood of “A” at time 1t  is essentially a quasi-stationary region 
of relative stability of I , then all neighbouring trajectories in this region can 
be labelled “A”. Similarly, all trajectory segments in the neighbourhood of “B” 
at time 1t  can similarly be labelled “B”. By contrast, a neighbourhood of “A” 
at time 0t will comprise a mixture of both “A” and “B” trajectories, indeed in 
this region the “A” and “B” trajectories will be intertwined with respect to one 
another on the invariant set (Palmer, 1995), describable as a probability 
mixture. Following the order-of-magnitude analysis of Penrose (1989) we 
associated this heterogeneity of relative stability on I  as being gravitationally 
induced, and the evolution of the world state towards a relatively stable 
quasi-stationary end point, as what we would experimentally refer to as a 
“measurement outcome”.   
 
From this point of view, it can be supposed that the quantum-theoretic state 
A Bψ α β= +  defines the probability that a randomly chosen trajectory 
segment in a neighbourhood of some p I∈ is an “A” trajectory or a “B” 
trajectory. Here the word “random” is defined with respect to an appropriate 
metric on the invariant set, see Section 2.1. Since Planck’s constant has the 
dimensions of phase-space area, we can use ℏ to fix the dimensional size of 
this neighbourhood. At 0t , “upstream” of a region of instability,  we can 
expect both α  and β  to be non-zero, whilst at 1t , in a region of stability, 
either α  or β  will be equal to zero. This evolution is what otherwise could be 
referred to as a “collapse” of the quantum state.  
 
In the laboratory, particle spin statistics are derived, for example, from a 
sample of measurements performed on a set of identically prepared particles.  
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These measurements and their “up/down” outcomes are properties of a single 
“fiducial” trajectory segment on the invariant set. By contrast, the notion of 
probability described above is based on a sample of trajectories in the 
neighbourhood of the fiducial trajectory. Hence it must be assumed that the 
statistical ensemble comprising neighbouring trajectories each with some 
specific ( ),A B  label, can be identified with a statistical ensemble of 
measurement outcomes specific to the fiducial trajectory. This issue is 
discussed further in Section 4.4.  
 
4.2 Contextuality and the Ontology of Counterfactual States 
 
The notion that there is some underlying causal deterministic process  which 
generates the sample space from which the quantum-theoretic notion of state 
can be defined, appears to run counter to the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem 
which clearly asserts that no such realistic interpretation of the quantum-
theoretic state is possible.  We discuss here why this theorem does not apply 
under the conditions of the Invariant Set Postulate.  
 
In conventional hidden-variable theory, it is assumed that a preparation 
procedure creates a quantum sub-system with certain intrinsic properties, and 
that different measurements reveal different aspects of these properties. The 
Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem shows that such non-contextual models are 
inconsistent with quantum theory. On the other hand, by requiring the world 
state to lie on its sparse invariant set, such a sub-system’s properties will not 
in fact be independent of the rest of the world state, and in particular of how 
the measurement device has been prepared. That is, the assumption that a 
sub-system necessarily has properties independent of the conceivable 
measurements made on it, may be wrong. The Invariant Set Postulate 
provides a physically-appealing basis for constructing a contextual hidden-
variable theory of quantum physics.  
 
To be more explicit, suppose Bob measures the spin of a spin-1/2 particle with 
his Stern-Gerlach apparatus oriented in the z direction. What would the 
measurement outcome have been had he measured at some angle θ  to the z 
direction? To attempt to give meaning to this question, we imagine a 
counterfactual world where everything, including the spin-1/2 particle, is as it 
was in the real world, except that the orientation of the Stern-Gerlach 
apparatus, here represented by the variable θ , has been changed. Can these 
counterfactual worlds be considered elements of physical reality? 
  
Let p I∈  denote the world state at the time Bob measures the spin of the 
particle. Let lθ  denote the line in state space passing through p  and pointing 
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in the state space direction where θ  varies, but where the values of all other 
components of the world state stay fixed. The intersections of lθ  with I  at 
points other than p  define the set { }Cθ  of counterfactual values for θ  allowed 
by the Invariant Set Postulate (points of intersection are counterfactual states 
which are also states of physical reality). Given { }Cθ ,  we can define a binary 
function { }( ) ,CSp A Bθ ∈  such that, according to the dynamics, Bob would 
have measured “up” if ( )CSp Aθ = , and spin “down” if ( )CSp Bθ = . 
 
However, the sparseness of I  suggests that counterfactual sets such as { }Cθ  
are in fact equal to the empty set. Consider, for example, a two dimensional 
set 2I , formed as the Cartesian product of two Cantor sets, whose ( , )x y  
coordinates are pairs of ternary fractions, each with the missing digit “1”. 
Now consider a line l  passing through the origin and oriented randomly in 
the sense that the gradient k of l  is a normal number. If l  were to intersect 2I  
at a point with coordinates ( , ) (0,0)C Cx y ≠ , then both 0x  and 0y  must be 
exceptional ternary fractions with missing digit “1”. However, this is almost 
certainly not the case; since k is normal, then a ternary expansion of C Cy kx=  
almost certainly contains the digit “1” even if the ternary expansion of Cx  
does not contain it.  
 
The emptiness of the counterfactual set, which we here assume, is consistent 
with the implications of the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem, that there can be 
no non-contextual hidden-variable representations of individual quantum 
systems. If there were a non-contextual hidden variable model, one could 
vary any one of its parameters keeping fixed other variables corresponding to 
the rest of the world state,  to obtain new elements of supposed physical 
reality.  
 
4.3 Towards the Abstract Hilbert Space 
 
If quantum theory could “see” the intricate structure of the invariant set, it 
would “know” whether a particular putative measurement orientation θ  was 
counterfactual or not. However, since, by hypothesis, quantum theory is blind 
to the intricate structure of I , it is unable to discriminate between factual and 
counterfactual measurement preparations and therefore admits them all as 
theoretically valid. Hence the quantum-theoretic notion of state is defined on 
a quantum sub-system in preparation for any measurement that could 
conceivably be performed on it, irrespective of whether this measurement 
turns out to be real or counterfactual. This raises a fundamental question. If 
we interpret the quantum-theoretic notion of state in terms of a sample space 
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defined by a ℏ  neighbourhood on the invariant set, how are we to interpret 
the quantum-theoretic notion of state associated with counterfactual world 
states of unreality, not on the invariant set, where no corresponding sample 
space exists?  
 
Consider the following analogy. The (rational) integers are rudimentary 
symbols of counting, used for example to express and compare the quantity 
of apples in piles of apples. As a consequence of being symbols of counting, 
these integers have certain algebraic properties: the sum, difference or 
product of two integers is a third. Based entirely on these algebraic properties, 
it is possible to extend the notion of integer to the Gaussian integers on the 
complex plane. These algebraic integers are defined by their algebraic 
properties, and no more have the primitive property of being symbols of 
counting; no piles of apples contain 1 2i+ apples! As long as we are not 
concerned whether an integer can be used to count piles of apples, then each 
point p of a Cartesian grid in the complex plane defines an integer. On the 
other hand, if we are told, as a result of some empirical study, that the integer 
at p describes the quantity of some particular pile of apples, then we can infer 
that p  must lie on the real axis of the complex plane! 
 
This analogy is useful in arriving at the required generalisation of the 
quantum theoretic notion of state in a theory blind to the intricate structure of 
the invariant set. 
 
Hence, when p I∈ (c.f. the real axis for the Gaussian integers), then 
A Bα β+  can be interpreted as a probability defined by some underlying 
sample space.  However, when p I∉   (c.f. the rest of the complex plane for 
the Gaussian integers), we define a probability-like state A Bα β+  from the 
algebraic properties of probability, ie in terms of the algebraic rules of vector 
spaces. Under such circumstances, A Bα β+  can no more be associated 
with any underling sample space. This “continuation off the invariant set” 
does not contradict Hardy’s definition of state, since if p I∉ , then its points 
are not elements of physical reality, and hence cannot be subject to actual 
measurement.  
 
It is worth discussing the corresponding situation in classical physics. A 
classical dynamical system is one defined by a set of deterministic differential 
equations. As such, there is no requirement in classical physics for states to lie 
on an invariant set, even if the differential equations support such a set. 
(Indeed, for systems which have a fractal invariant set, the probability that a 
state lies on it precisely is zero, and the invariant set is thus an ontological 
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irrelevance.) As a result, for a classical system, every point in phase space is a 
point of “physical reality”, and the counterfactual states discussed above are 
as much states of “physical reality” as are the real world states.  Hence, the 
world of classical physics is perfectly non-contextual, and is not consistent 
with the Invariant Set Postulate. The question of how classicality can emerge 
from the Invariant Set Postulate is discussed in Section 5.6. 
 
The following interpretation of the two dimensional Hilbert Space spanned 
by the vectors A  and B , eg in the context of Bob’s spin measurements, 
emerges from the Invariant Set Postulate. At any time t  there corresponds a 
point in the Hilbert Space where  A Bα β+  can be interpreted 
straightforwardly as a frequentist probability based on an underlying sample 
space of trajectory segments in a ℏ  neighbourhood on the invariant set. 
However, since the invariant set and hence its underlying deterministic 
dynamics are themselves non-computable, it is algorithmically undecidable as 
to whether any given point in the Hilbert Space can be associated with such a 
sample space or not; as such, each point of the Hilbert Space is as likely to 
support an underlying sample space as any other. For points in the Hilbert 
Space which have no correspondence with a sample space on the invariant 
set, A Bα β+  must be considered an abstract mathematical quantity 
defined purely in terms of the algebraic rules governing a vector space.  
 
Consistent with the rather straightforward probabilistic interpretation of the 
quantum-theoretic notion of state on the invariant set, it is reasonable to 
suppose that, on the invariant set, the Schrödinger equation is itself a 
Liouville equation for conservation of probability in regions where dynamical 
evolution is Hamiltonian (ie in regions not associated with black holes). Since 
quantum theory is blind to the intricate structure of the invariant set, the 
quantum-theoretic Schrödinger equation must be formulated in abstract 
Hilbert space form, ie in terms of unitary evolution, using algebraic properties 
of probability without reference to an underlying sample space.  
 
One algebraic property inherited from the Schrödinger equation’s 
interpretation as a Liouville equation on the invariant set, is linearity: as an 
equation for conservation of probability, the Liouville equation, cf equation 
(1.1), is always linear, even when the underlying dynamics ( )=X f Xɺ  are 
strongly nonlinear. This suggests that attempts to add nonlinear terms 
(deterministic or stochastic) to the Schrödinger equation eg during 
measurement, are misguided. 
 
4.4 Role of the Complex Numbers 
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The quantum-theoretic state is an element of a complex-number Hilbert 
Space, ,  α β ∈C . The discussion so far has not so far touched on the essential 
role that the complex numbers play in quantum theory. We discuss in this 
Section a novel interpretation for the role of the complex numbers, in the 
context of the Invariant Set Postulate.  
 
The use of complex numbers, ie ,  α β ∈C  in A Bα β+  and more 
specifically the use of quaternions in representing the quantum-theoretic 
notion of spin, is an essential element of quantum theory. How can such 
complex numbers be represented in the “realistic” context of the Invariant Set 
Postulate?  Let  
 
 ( )1 2 3 4, , , ,...S a a a a=  (2.1) 
 
where { },ia A B∈  denote a sample space of “A” or “B” trajectories in a 
neighbourhood of the invariant set from which, as in Section 4.1, A Bα β+  
is defined.  Now let A B=  and B A=  and 
 
 ( )1 2 3 4, , , ,...S a a a a− =  (2.2) 
 
so that S  and S− denote two anti-correlated sample spaces. Writing 
 
 ( ) ( )2 1 4 3, , , ,...i S a a a a=  (2.3) 
 
(with operator repetition on successive pairs of elements) then 2 ( )i S S= − , so 
that i  is a “square root of minus one”, and S  and ( )i S  are uncorrelated but 
nevertheless dependent sample spaces ( ie ( )i S  depends on S ). Similarly, 
writing 
 
 
( ) { }
( ) { }
( ) { }
1 2 1 4 3
2 3 4 1 2
4 3 2 13
, , , ...
, , , ...
, , , ...
e S a a a a
e S a a a a
e S a a a a
=
=
=
 (2.4) 
 
(with operator repetition on successive quadruplets of elements) then each of 
1 2 3, ,e e e  is also a “square root of minus one” and collectively they satisfy the 
rules of quaternionic multiplication, ie  
.  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 3e e S e e S e e S e e e S S= = = = −      (2.5) 
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It should be noted that the representations (2.4) are not unique, other sets of 
quaternionically-related strings can be defined from permutation operators 
acting on successive octuplets and so on; see Palmer, 2004.  Using these more 
general representations, then strings 1S ′ , which are partially correlated both 
with S  and with, say, ( )1e S , are readily constructed.  
 
As is well know, the Pauli spin matrices are themselves related to quaternions 
and exploit the (surjective) homomorphism between (2)SU  and (3)SO .  
 
These permutation representations suggest the following symbolic proposal 
for the role of the complex numbers in the context of the Invariant Set 
Postulate. For neighbourhoods on the invariant set, where the quantum state 
A Bα β+  is associated with an underlying sample space represented by the 
binary sequence S , the Pauli operators have granular permutation-based 
representations (here 1 2 3,  ,  z y xie ie ieσ σ σ= = = − ), which map S  to 
deterministically related sample spaces eg 1 2 3. ,  ...S S S′ ′ ′ . In this way, it is 
suggested that compound “entangled” quantum-theoretic states can be 
associated with multiple bit strings ie multiple binary sample spaces, which 
are deterministically related to one another. Each of the  1 2 3. ,  ...S S S′ ′ ′  
represents a binary sample space of labels over a common set of neighbouring 
trajectories. Using the linkage between (2)SU  and (3)SO , these labels can be 
taken to refer to “yes/no” measurement outcomes associated with multiple 
orientations in physical 3-space.   
 
Off the invariant set, the notion of “entanglement” can only be defined in the 
context of the abstract Hilbert Space, ie without any underlying sample 
spaces, consistent with the discussion in Section 4.3.  
 
A key element of the geometry of fractal invariant sets is self similarity.  As 
mentioned in Section 2.1, such self-similarity can be revealed by “zooming” 
into a static fractal set. In the case of a dynamic set, self similarity can be 
revealed by state-space amplification by the positive-exponent Lyapunov 
vectors. Consider a set of trajectories on the invariant set in the 
neighbourhood of the fiducial trajectory, and labelled by the bit string S . 
Through the action of the positive-exponent Lyapunov vectors, these 
trajectories will diverge from one another and eventually leave the 
neighbourhood. In their place will “appear” (relative to some scale defined by 
the appropriate metric on the invariant set, cf the resolution of the eye when 
viewing fractal sets) a replacement set of trajectories, previously existing on 
some previously small scales. Label this replacement set of trajectories by 
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some new bit string S ′ . Self similarity can then be associated with an 
oscillation of the form S S S′→ → ⋅⋅⋅ .  Using the quaternionic bit-string 
representations above, one can express corresponding self similar oscillations 
by the form  
 
 ( ) ( )1 1S e S S e S S⋅ ⋅ ⋅ → → − → − → → ⋅⋅⋅  (2.6) 
 
of the phase-quadrature components, thus providing the basis for a “realistic” 
representation of phase evolution ( )exp i tω , as required by the Schrödinger 
equation.  
 
This geometric self-similar structure must be manifest on the fiducial 
trajectory itself. Consistent with the discussion at the end of Section 4.1, it 
must be assumed that S , and the associated quaternionic mappings of S , can 
also represent an ensemble of labels of the fiducial trajectory segment relative 
to different state-space directions. 
 
These relationships between the complex numbers on the one hand, and the 
symbolic structure of I  on the other, provide profound constraints on the 
topology of the invariant set. These constraints rule out the Lorenz or Rossler 
attractors, or other standard dynamical systems models, as viable “toy” 
models of the invariant set of the universe, even though such invariant sets 
are themselves fractal. Given the non-computability of fractal invariant sets, 
the analysis here suggests that the most likely approach to finding a robust 
mathematical representation of the invariant set of the universe is through the 
symbolic approach; as discussed in Section 2.1, this approach can define the 
invariant set to topological equivalence.  Indeed, as remarked by Bohr 
himself, the very fact that a quantum-theoretic state has the form A Bα β+ , 
suggests that quantum theory is itself profoundly symbolic.  
 
5 An Invariant-Set Perspective on the “Mysteries” of Quantum 
Theory  
 
In Section 4, a new approach to the foundations of quantum physics has been 
outlined based on an ontological postulate defined on the cosmological scale. 
The approach is not yet in the form of a rigorous mathematical theory which 
can somehow “subsume” standard quantum theory. Nevertheless, it is 
appropriate to discuss the implications of this approach in helping to make 
sense of the standard “mysteries” of quantum physics, in terms of ideas we 
can comprehend. Hence, in this section, the ideas developed in Section 4 are 
put to work.  
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5.1 The Superposed State and Quantum Coherence 
 
In standard interpretations of quantum theory, the superposed state has 
ontological significance and cannot be interpreted “merely” as a probability of 
ignorance of some underlying deterministic process. Hence is not true that 
Schrödinger’s cat is either alive or dead (it’s just we don’t know which). In the 
context of the Invariant Set Postulate, the superposed quantum state 
A Bα β+  has no fundamental ontological significance; it indeed describes a 
probability of ignorance, here ignorance of the intricate structure of the 
invariant set based on a sample space of trajectory segments in some 
neighbourhood on the invariant set. From this perspective,  Schrödinger’s cat 
is alive or dead, and not both.  
 
5.2 The Measurement Problem 
 
The Invariant Set Postulate provides a straightforward resolution of the 
measurement problem. By performing measurements we humans acquire 
information about the world state. That is, by empirical means, we become 
more knowledgeable about I  than could ever be gleaned from quantum 
theory alone. In quantum theory this empirical information is ingested 
through a “collapse of the wavefunction”, a process external to quantum 
theory itself.  
  
If the notion of superposition has no fundamental ontological significance, 
then neither has measurement. Rather, a measurement outcome “merely” 
labels a quasi-stationary quasi-stable region of the invariant set. There are no 
“jumps” in the world state as a result of measurement, since the world state 
was never in a superposition in the first place.  
 
5.3 The Copenhagen Interpretation vs Einstein Reality 
 
The Invariant Set Postulate reconciles Einstein’s views on quantum theory, 
with those of Bohr, Heisenberg and Pauli, as summarised in the Copenhagen 
Interpretation. 
 
On the one hand, consistent with Einstein’s view, the Invariant Set Postulate 
indicates that quantum theory is incomplete in the sense that it is blind to the 
fractal structure of the invariant set and hence ID . With respect to ID , physics 
is both deterministic (no dice) and locally causal (no spooky effects).  
 
On the other hand, the Invariant Set Postulate provides an objective basis for 
understanding why the observer is a partner in the very concept of reality. 
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From the Invariant Set Postulate, it is not meaningful to regard an individual 
quantum system as having any intrinsic properties independent of the 
invariant set on which the whole world state evolves.  The invariant set is in 
part characterised by the experiments which inform us humans about it. 
Hence, the Invariant Set Postulate implies that it is not meaningful to regard a 
quantum sub-system as having any intrinsic properties independent of the 
measurements performed on the quantum system. Since experimenters play a 
role in determining the nature of these measurements, they manifestly also 
play a key role in defining the very concept of reality. This is one of the key 
tenets of the Copenhagen Interpretation.  
 
5.4 Wave-Particle Duality, Bohmian Theory and Delayed-Choice 
Measurement 
 
Following Feynman, wave-particle duality is often viewed as the central 
mystery of quantum theory. For example, how is it that a single particle 
“knows” how to avoid regions of destructive wave interference? In terms of 
the Invariant Set Postulate, the paradox is easily resolved, in principle at least. 
Since the state-space geometry of the invariant set is presumed to determine 
observed probabilities,  then in a two-slit experiment, the world state where 
particles travel to regions of destructive wave interference will not lie on the 
invariant set, and therefore will not correspond to a state of physical reality. 
In this regard, one could regard the quantum potential of Bohmian theory 
(Bohm and Hiley, 2005) as a coarse-grain (“ 2L ”) potential-well description of 
the constraint required to keep the world state on the invariant set.  
 
Wave-particle duality is an example of the type of complementarity discussed 
above in the context of particle spin. Hence, having performed a “wave” 
experiment on a system, the corresponding counterfactual “particle” 
experiment (eg what would have happened if one slit were to have been 
closed off) lies off the invariant set and does not correspond to physical 
reality.  
 
In this context, the Invariant Set Postulate can also readily account for the 
notion that the state of a quantum sub-system at 0t t=  can be influenced by 
measurements whose characteristics are seemingly only determined at 1 0t t≫ . 
For example, Bob can postpone “deciding” whether to make a “wave” 
measurement or a “particle” measurement, long after the time when the 
quantum sub-system has to “make up its mind” whether to behave as a wave 
or as a particle. This apparent paradox is resolved by recalling that the notion 
of the invariant set is an atemporal one. Whether or not a world state lies on 
the invariant set at some time 0t t=  and hence is a point of reality, may 
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depend on measurement events to the (indefinite) future 0t . (This is 
effectively another expression of the non-computability of the invariant set.) 
Labelling a trajectory “A=wave” at 0t  only makes sense if there is a 
corresponding quasi-stationary region “A=wave” of the invariant set into 
which the trajectory evolves.  
 
5.5 Nonlocality 
 
As Bell has pointed out (Bell, 1995), the notion that quantum mechanics is not 
locally causal (ie is nonlocal), depends on treating experimental parameters, 
such as the orientation of measuring devices, as free variables. Since ID  is 
considered to be causal, the role of the Invariant Set Postulate as a restriction 
on the existence of free variables becomes a central issue in assessing whether 
quantum physics is nonlocal.   
 
‘tHooft (2007) relates the notion of a free variable to the Unrestricted Initial 
State condition, which he describes as having consequences similar to free 
will, but not clashing with determinism. In motivating the Unrestricted Initial 
State condition, ‘tHooft says: “…we must demand that our model [of nature] 
gives credible scenarios for a universe for any choice of the initial conditions.”  
 
The Unrestricted Initial State condition is certainly plausible for any physical 
theory based solely on differential equations, eg the laws of classical physics. 
However, it manifestly fails in the context of Invariant Set Postulate. In this 
latter case,  the only “credible scenarios” are associated with initial conditions 
which lie on the invariant set. As discussed above, this is a sufficient 
restriction to rule out counterfactual states.  
 
Using the language of hidden variable theory, let ( | , )a bP λ θ θ  denote the 
probability of some hidden-variable λ  given EPR measurement orientations 
aθ  and bθ . Conventionally, in hidden-variable theory, one assumes 
that ( )( | , )a bP Pλ θ θ λ=  (eg Weinstein, 2008) and this leads to the conventional 
Bell inequalities. By the discussion above, this condition is manifestly false in 
the context of the Invariant Set Postulate.   
 
Some argue that the real mystery of quantum nonlocality is that Bell-
inequality-violating correlations exist without any superluminal 
communication between particles. To explain this mystery, consider the 
following two “causal” statements: a) whenever I clap my hands in the 
college quad, I hear the echo a fraction of a second later; b) if I were to have 
clapped my hands in the college quad, I would have heard the echo a fraction 
of a second later. With respect to the Invariant Set Postulate, statement a) is 
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true since the dynamics of acoustic waves is assumed causal. However, 
statement b) is not true since it is counterfactual. As such, the Invariant Set 
Postulate explains why it is possible for there to be no superluminal 
communication (arising from the truth of a)-type statements), whilst at the 
same time admitting Bell-inequality-violating correlations (possible because 
of the non-truth of b)-type statements).  
 
Similarly one might ask why, if experimental settings at spacelike-separated 
locations cannot be varied independently of one another, should the outcome 
at one wing of an EPR experiment be independent of the experimental setting 
at the other? Like the notion of causality in the previous paragraph, here we 
note that the notion of “independent” can have two different meanings. Two 
timeseries can be viewed as statistically independent if they are uncorrelated, 
or more generally, if no functional dependence can be found between them. 
On the other hand, the same two timeseries can be viewed as dependent in 
the sense that any attempt to vary one timeseries keeping the other fixed will 
violate the conditions under which the timeseries have been constructed.  
 
One philosophical objection to any restriction on the notion that experimental 
parameters are “free”, is that one could set these experimental parameters on 
some whim, eg the toss of a coin, or the outcome of the Swiss Lottery, or the 
sixth digit of the frequency of a photon originating in Alpha Centuri. If 
measurement orientations can depend on outcomes which seem “irrelevant” 
as far as the evolution of the rest of the universe is concerned, then surely 
these experimental parameters are for all practical purposes, free? This was an 
argument John Bell himself used (Bell, 1995).  
 
Here we refer back to the Takens Embedding Theorem - that the entire 
invariant set can be reconstructed from a sufficiently long timeseries of any 
component of the state vector, even if this component is energetically 
unimportant and seemingly irrelevant to the evolution of the rest of the 
universe. Hence it is inconsistent to conclude from the seemingly whimsical 
examples above, that measurement orientations can be made dependent on 
variables which are themselves irrelevant to or independent of the evolution 
of the rest of the world state.  
 
Another potential objection to the notion that experimental parameters are 
other than “free”, is that it might appear to make us humans, we who fix 
these parameters, seem no different to automata. However, by the Invariant 
Set Postulate, this is not the case. We humans are conscious beings. As such, 
we acknowledge as “real” the physical world around us. Hence, by the 
Invariant Set Postulate, we acknowledge the reality of I . That is, we 
acknowledge the reality of something which is fundamentally non-
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algorithmic. As stressed by Penrose (1989), no automaton would be capable of 
this! 
 
Theories which constrain the existence or notion of free variables might be 
classed as “superdeterministic”. However, it is important to distinguish the 
conventional idea of superdeterminism with that of the Invariant Set 
Postulate. Conventional superdeterminism is an ad hoc approach and hence 
unappealing. For example, superdeterminism presumes that the actual initial 
state of the universe is the only allowable initial state. Yet, why should this 
be? By contrast, the restrictions on experimental parameters implied by the 
Invariant Set Postulate are a consequence of a invoking a certain type of 
invariance - dynamical invariance. As mentioned above, invariance and 
symmetry are the bedrocks of theoretical physics and therefore not at all ad 
hoc. By contrast with standard superdeterministic thinking, the Invariant Set 
Postulate provides an appealing theoretical basis for constraining what would 
otherwise be unconstrained free variables.  
 
In conclusion, insofar as the word “nonlocality” is shorthand for “not locally 
causal”, then in the framework of the Invariant Set Postulate, quantum 
physics is not nonlocal.  
 
5.6 Emergence of Classicality 
 
It is well known that the classical limit cannot be reached by letting 0→ℏ . 
This is consistent with the notion that the intertwined ( ),A B  trajectory 
structures on I  persist to arbitrarily small scales in state space (cf Fig 1 in the 
vicinity of the fiducial trajectory). In this sense, the ℏ  probability structure 
in the limit 0=ℏ  is singular (c.f. Berry, 2002).  
 
As noted above, classical systems are not themselves bound by the Invariant 
Set Postulate. How then does the Invariant Set Postulate solve the “mystery” 
of emergence of classicality? One way to address this question is to consider 
the structure of the invariant set associated with time-averaged states. By the 
central limit theorem, we know that the measure of the invariant set 
associated with sufficiently long time-averaged states is Gaussian, and hence 
not fractal. A similar continuum measure would arise if I was projected into a 
small dimensional subspace (cf “tracing out” the environmental degrees of 
freedom to use the language of decoherence theory). With such a smooth 
measure, the counterfactual set would not be the empty set, indeed in the 
(Gaussian) limit, a counterfactual set such as { }Cθ  in Section 4.2 would be all 
of 0 2θ pi≤ ≤  and the (fractal-based) arguments about counterfactuality would 
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fail. In this (time-averaged or projected) situation, the system would behave 
as if it were classical.  
 
5.7 Quantum Uncertainty 
 
Using the concept of algebraic abstraction discussed in Section 4.2, quantum 
theory provides a consistent mathematical definition of “state”, irrespective of 
whether that quantum-theoretic state is related to a sample space of 
underlying deterministic processes or not. Quantum theory is blind to the 
intricate structure of the invariant set, and because the invariant set is not 
computable, quantum theory cannot be supplemented by any algorithm to 
determine whether the quantum-theoretic state is associated with an 
underlying sample space or not. In this sense, mathematical undecidability 
appears to be  closely related to the notion uncertainty in quantum theory.  
 
5.8 Quantum Computing and the Multiverse  
 
The dynamical laws ID  are presumed to encode the underlying geometry 
of I in state space. What form should ID  take? As discussed in Section 4, the 
symbolic form for ID  on some fiducial trajectory segment, must reflect the 
symbolic properties of trajectories in a neighbourhood on the invariant set. In 
this respect, there is a partial analogy with the equation for a geodesic in 
space time, where the geodesic coordinates depend on the geometry of space 
time in the neighbourhood of the geodesic (as reflected in the appearance of 
connection coefficients in the geodesic equation). This required form for ID  
can be contrasted with dynamical evolution equations ( )=X F Xɺ  in classical 
physics, where time derivatives are determined solely by the values of the 
state X  at any chosen point in state space, and not on surrounding values. 
This may provide the conceptual basis to understand the relative power of 
quantum computing over classical computing.   
 
From a geometric perspective, the notion that the quantum theoretic state is a 
“coarse-grain” probabilistic representation based on a sample space from 
neighbourhoods of the invariant set, seems comprehensible. On the other 
hand, if looked at from a perspective where attention is focussed exclusively 
on dynamical evolution of the fiducial trajectory, such a probabilistic notion 
may seem bizarre: it may take such a long time (ie such a large parameter 
length t ) before the world state returns to a ℏ neighbourhood of its current 
state on the invariant set, that two neighbouring world states actually belong 
to different eons of the universe (eg Bojowald, 2007; Penrose, 2008). Forming 
probabilities from such a multiverse sample space may seem almost 
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Everettian in concept, and very difficult to comprehend. This is why the 
atemporal geometric picture of the invariant set, proposed here, has appeal.  
 
5.9 The Role of Gravity in Quantum Physics 
 
Gravity has often been suggested as playing a role in quantum theory, 
principally as a mechanism that induces quantum state vector collapse (cf 
Objective Reduction; Penrose, 1989). However, at an ontological level, the 
Invariant Set Postulate does not require superposed states and hence does not 
require a collapse mechanism, gravitational or otherwise.  
 
On the other hand, the order-of-magnitude estimates provided by Penrose 
(1989), that gravitational processes can be locally significant when a quantum 
sub-system and a measuring apparatus interact, seem persuasive. Here we 
would interpret these estimates as supporting the notion that gravity plays a 
key role in defining the state space geometry of the invariant set, in particular 
in defining the regions of relative stability  (small local Lyapunov exponents) 
and relative instability of I  (large local Lyapunov exponents). As discussed 
above, black hole thermodynamics may additionally provide the mechanism 
which leads to the dimensional reduction of the invariant set compared with 
that of the underlying state space. 
 
Indeed this leads to the following rather radical suggestion. If the geometry of 
I  is to be considered primitive, then the geometric properties of the invariant 
set which lead to certain regions being relatively stable and other regions 
unstable, should be considered a generalisation of the notion introduced by 
Einstein, that the phenomenon we call “gravity” is merely a manifestation of 
some more primitive notion of geometry - here the geometry of a 
dynamically-invariant subset of state space. As such, a challenge for the 
future will be to try to unify the notions of pseudo-Riemannian geometry for 
space-time, and fractal geometry for state space. This is a very different 
perspective on “quantum gravity” than suggested by any existing approaches 
to the subject.  
 
From this we can make two gravitationally relevant predictions. Firstly, since 
gravitational processes are not needed to collapse the quantum state vector, 
experiments to detect gravitational decoherence (eg as would be needed in 
the Objective Reduction mechanism) may fail. By contrast with Objective 
Reduction, I could be seen as providing the preferred basis, with respect to 
which conventional non-gravitational decoherent processes operate. 
Secondly, if gravity should be seen as a manifestation of the heterogeneity in 
the geometry of the invariant set, then attempts to quantise gravity with the 
framework of standard quantum theory, will also fail. As such, it is 
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misguided to assume (as almost all serious attempts have so far done) that 
“theories of everything”, can be formulated within conventional quantum 
theory.  
 
6 Conclusions  
 
Principles of invariance and symmetry form the bedrock of physics. Based on 
a type of dynamical invariance, a new law of physics is proposed, directly 
relevant at the cosmological level. Specifically, the Invariant Set Postulate 
subordinates the notion of the differential equation and elevates as primitive, 
a dynamically invariant fractal geometry in the state space of the universe. 
This geometry is used to define the notion of physical reality - states of 
physical reality are precisely those on the invariant set. It is suggested that 
this postulate has profound implications for our understanding of quantum 
physics and the corresponding role of gravity.   
 
The Invariant Set Postulate is motivated by two quite disparate ideas in 
physics. Firstly, certain nonlinear dynamical systems have measure-zero, 
nowhere-dense, self-similar non-computational invariant sets. Secondly, the 
behaviour of extreme gravitationally bound systems is described by the 
irreversible laws of thermodynamics at a fundamental rather than 
phenomenological level. 
 
In the 1960s, the introduction of global space-time geometric and topological 
methods, transformed our understanding of classical gravitational physics 
(Penrose, 1965). It is proposed that the introduction of global geometric and 
topological methods in state space, may similarly transform our 
understanding of quantum gravitational physics. Combining these rather 
different forms of geometry may provide the missing element needed to 
advance the search for a unified theory of physics.  
 
Future papers will attempt to provide the mathematical detail required to 
develop this exploratory analysis into a rigorous physical theory.  
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